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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recognizing the implications that global climate change may have 
on Minnesota’s economy, environment, and quality of life, Governor Tim 
Pawlenty announced the Next Generation Energy Initiative, a state program 
with the goals of increasing energy efficiency among electrical and natural 
utilities by requiring Minnesota utilities to provide  twenty-five percent of 
electricity from renewable sources by 2025 and lowering statewide 
greenhouse gas emissions by  fifteen percent by 2015,  thirty percent by 
2025, and  eighty percent by 2050.1 Pursuant to this initiative, the state 
legislature passed the Next Generation Energy Act of 2007 (NGEA).2  
Five years after its enactment, the NGEA is under attack. 3  On 
November 2, 2011, North Dakota commenced an action against Minnesota in 
an effort to strike down the portion of the NGEA that prohibits the 
importation of any power that would contribute to the state’s carbon dioxide 
emissions based on, among other things, its alleged violation of the 
Commerce Clause.4 Despite North Dakota’s protest, the NGEA does not 
violate the Commerce Clause and will survive this challenge unscathed, as 
the law is not facially discriminatory, serves an important local purpose that 
outweighs any incidental burden on interstate commerce, and satisfies the 
Pike standard.5   
In Part II of this paper, I will review the NGEA, including the 
provisions currently under scrutiny. 6  In Part III, I will examine North 
Dakota’s previous challenge to Minnesota’s carbon policy and analyze the 
current litigation regarding the NGEA.7 Then in Part IV, I will examine the 
history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.8 In Part V, I will assess both 
North Dakota and Minnesota’s Commerce Clause arguments.9 Finally, in 
Part VI I will conclude that the NGEA does not violate the Commerce 
Clause.10 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 1  Alternative Fuels — Federal and State Legislation, MINN. POLLUTION 
CONTROL AGENCY, http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/topics/energy/alternative-fuels/ 
alternative-fuels-legislation.html (last visited May 9, 2012). 
 2  MINN. STAT. § 216C.05 (2010). 
 3  See infra Part III. 
 4  See infra Part III. 
 5  See infra Part V.  
 6  See infra Part II. 
 7  See infra Part III. 
 8  See infra Part IV.  
 9  See infra Part V.  
 10  See infra Part VI.  
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II. THE NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT OF 2007 
 
The NGEA mandates the following: 
 
(1) the per capita use of fossil fuel as an energy input be 
reduced by 15 percent by the year 2015, through increased 
reliance on energy efficiency and renewable energy 
alternatives; and (2) 25 percent of the total energy used in 
the state be derived from renewable energy resources by the 
year 2025.11 
 
In order to achieve these goals, the NGEA prohibits any person (1) from 
constructing in Minnesota a “new large energy facility that would contribute 
to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions”12, (2) “import[ing] or 
commit[ting] to import from outside the state power from a new large energy 
facility that would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide 
emissions”13, and (3) “enter[ing] into a long-term power purchase agreement 
that would increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.”14 The 
NGEA defines “statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions” as “the 
total annual emissions of carbon dioxide from the generation of electricity 
within the state and all emissions of carbon dioxide from the generation of 
electricity imported from outside the state and consumed in Minnesota.”15 
This includes “[e]missions . . . associated with transmission and distribution 
line losses . . . .”16  
 
 
III. CHALLENGING THE NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT 
 
 Although the provisions discussed above are the center of North 
Dakota’s present action against Minnesota, they represent only the latest 
installment of North Dakota’s displeasure with Minnesota’s carbon policy.17 
 
A. In re Quantification of Environmental Costs 
  
 In 1993, the Minnesota Legislature passed a law that “attempted to 
install environmental costs as a factor in resource planning decisions made 
by the [Public Utilities Commission (PUC)].”18 The PUC set interim cost 
                                                 
 11  MINN. STAT. § 216C.05 (2010). 
 12  MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3(1) (2010). 
 13  MINN. STAT. §216H.03 subd. 3(2) (2010). 
 14  MINN. STAT. §216H.03 subd. 3(3) (2010). 
 15  MINN. STAT. §216H.03 subd. 2 (2010). 
 16  Id. 
 17  See infra Part III.A.  
 18  In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998). 
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values on five air emissions, including carbon dioxide.19 After setting the 
interim values, the PUC initiated a contested case before an administrative 
law judge (ALJ) to set final values.20 The ALJ recommended setting the 
environmental costs of CO2 at $.28–$2.92 per ton, varying by geography.21 
The PUC eventually set the environmental cost values of CO2 at $.30–$3.10 
per ton for each of the geographic areas identified by the ALJ.22 One of the 
geographic areas identified by the PUC was the area within 200 miles of the 
border.23 Several parties then requested rehearing or reconsideration based on 
the geographic distinctions, which the PUC granted.24 After reconsideration, 
the PUC removed cost value on the 200 mile range, even though the PUC 
believed it could require out-of-state utilities to use the value.25 Relators, a 
nonprofit trade association that represented lignite fuel producers, users, and 
suppliers (including the state of North Dakota), and an environmental 
coalition then petitioned for writ of certiorari on the issue of the carbon 
dioxide values.26 
 After finding the case ripe for review, the court addressed the 
environmental coalition’s argument that the PUC acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, and against legislative intent, when it decided to set 
environmental costs for carbon dioxide in the 200 mile range at zero, even 
though it had previously determined it was practical to do so.27 The court 
sided with the PUC in holding that the PUC’s decision to remove the carbon 
dioxide value could be characterized as a decision to adhere to statutory 
language and thus was not reversible error.28  
 Although the court decided the case on other grounds, one can gain a 
sense of the history and circumstances surrounding North Dakota’s 
continued fight against Minnesota’s energy policy. 29  In addition, the 
underlying argument in this case was based on the dormant Commerce 
Clause theory, which is the same theory North Dakota Attorney General 
Wayne Stenehjem (Stenehjem) has indicated will be the center of his case 
against the NGEA.30  
 
                                                 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. at 797. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d at 797. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. at 801. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. See also supra Part III.A. 
 30  See Patrick Zomer, Note, The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota, 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 60, 61–62 (2010); Christopher 
Bjorke, N.D. Likely to Sue Minnesota over Carbon Tax, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 29, 2009, 
http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/local/article_a6fafd5a-f409-11de-bb24-001cc4c03286. 
html.  
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B. North Dakota v. Swanson 
 
 North Dakota first voiced its intention to commence an action 
against Minnesota when Stenehjem told the Bismarck Tribune on December 
29, 2009 that it “is very likely that we will be suing the state of Minnesota.”31 
Indicating the strength of their resolve, the North Dakota Legislature 
approved a litigation war chest of $500,000. 32  On November 2, 2011, 
Stenehjem made good on his threat and filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota.33 
 
1. The Complaint 
 
 In its complaint, North Dakota argued that the NGEA is 
unconstitutional because of multiple violations of constitutional provisions.34 
 
a. The Commerce Clause 
 
 North Dakota first argued that the NGEA violates the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as it “facially discriminates against the 
Plaintiffs because it prohibits the importation” of power generated from 
certain power plants in North Dakota into Minnesota.35 In addition, North 
Dakota argued that the NGEA “facially discriminates against interstate 
commerce because it exempts new large energy facilities located in 
Minnesota and new large energy facilities owned by Minnesota-based 
entities.”36 The complaint goes on to state that these prohibitions unduly 
burden interstate commerce and are not justified “by valid public welfare, 
consumer protection, or procompetitive purpose unrelated to economic 
protectionism.”37 
 
b. The Supremacy Clause 
 
 Second, North Dakota argued that the NGEA violates the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution because Congress has made it clear that it 
intends to occupy the field of emissions regulations and the regulation of 
                                                 
 31  Christopher Bjorke, N.D. Likely to Sue Minnesota over Carbon Tax, BISMARCK 
TRIB., Dec. 29, 2009, http:// www.bismarcktribune.com/news/local/article_a6fafd5a-f409-
11de-bb24-001cc4c03286.html. 
 32  Jennifer Bjorhus, North Dakota vs. Minnesota: Dust-up over Carbon, STAR 
TRIB., Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.startribune.com/business/81606907.html. 
 33  See infra Part 3.B.1. 
 34  Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 27–39, North 
Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (8th Cir. Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Amended 
Complaint]. See also infra Part III.B.1.A–D. 
 35  Id. at 27. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. at 29. 
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energy sales and transmission.38 Regarding the field of emissions regulations, 
North Dakota cites case law surrounding the Clean Air Act that states there 
exists “a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”39 North 
Dakota argued that the NGEA “conflicts with the Clean Air Act because it 
purports to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide.”40 Regarding the field of 
electricity sales and transmission, North Dakota argued that pursuant to the 
Federal Power Act and the authority delegated to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the federal 
government acts as the exclusive regulator and the NGEA unlawfully 
expands Minnesota’s regulatory prowess into the area of transmission of 
electricity in interstate commerce.41 According to North Dakota, Minnesota’s 
expansion into this field violates the Supremacy Clause, as Congress has 
shown intent to occupy the field.42 
 
c. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
 
 Next, North Dakota argued that the NGEA violates the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution by unfairly discriminating 
against and imposing an unreasonable burden on citizens of other states.43 
North Dakota contends that the NGEA imposes an unreasonable burden on 
the citizens of North Dakota, especially those working in the lignite and coal-
powered electricity industries, by giving preferential treatment to Minnesota 
citizens and entities.44 North Dakota argued that this preferential treatment 
negatively impacts employment opportunities for North Dakota citizens.45 
North Dakota further contends that these practices embodied in the NGEA 
do not bear a substantial relationship to the goals of the law nor does 
Minnesota have a substantial reason for them.46 
 
d. Due Process  
 
 In addition to the previous arguments, North Dakota alleged 
deprivation of property without due process of law on the basis that 
“Plaintiffs have property interests in the productive use of coal and other 
resources that are . . . consumed in the creation and operation of facilities” 
that are subject to the prohibition in the NGEA.47 
                                                 
 38  Id. at 29–34. 
 39  Id. at 30 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 40  Amended Complaint, supra note 34, at 30. 
 41  Id. at 31–32. 
 42  Id. at 33–34. 
 43  Id. at 34–35. 
 44  Id. at 35. 
 45  Id.  
 46  Amended Complaint, supra note 34, at 35. 
 47  Id. at 38. 
6
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/6
2013] NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT 485 
 Finally, North Dakota made one argument unrelated to the U.S. 
Constitution: that the NGEA violates the prohibition of special legislation 
provision of the Minnesota Constitution. 48  This provision states, “[t]he 
legislature shall pass no local or special law . . . granting to any private 
corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, 
immunity, or franchise whatever . . . .”49  North Dakota argued that the 
NGEA violates this provision by “grant[ing] special privileges and 
immunities to several private corporations,” such as Essar Global, Steel 
Dynamics, Inc., Excelsior Energy, Inc., Otter Tail Power Company, and 
Great River Energy, by exempting them from the requirements of the 
NGEA.50 According to North Dakota’s Amended Complaint, this violation 
constitutes a defect in the legislative process thereby denying Plaintiffs due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.51 
 After setting forth its arguments, North Dakota moved for 
declaratory judgment holding the NGEA unconstitutional, enjoining 
Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson from enforcing the NGEA, and 
awarding costs and expenses incurred during the litigation.52 
 
2. The Answer 
  
 In its answer, Minnesota denied that the NGEA was unconstitutional 
and provided the following three separate defenses:  
 
(1) The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted; (2) The Amended Complaint is 
barred in part by the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) The 
Amended Complaint fails in whole or in part otherwise for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.53 
 
In addition, Minnesota asked the court to dismiss North Dakota’s complaint 
with prejudice and award costs.54 
 
3. Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings 
  
 After filing its answer, Minnesota filed a motion for partial judgment 
on the pleadings.55 Minnesota moved the court to “dismiss counts II through 
                                                 
 48  Id. at 37. 
 49  MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1. 
 50  Amended Complaint, supra note 34, at 38. 
 51  Id. at 38–39. 
 52  Id. at 39–40. 
 53  Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 16, North Dakota v. 
Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (8th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Answer]. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings at 1, North Dakota 
v. Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (8th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Motion]. 
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VI of [North Dakota’s] amended complaint, and to dismiss the Attorney 
General as a party, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”56   
 An order was entered on September 30, 2012, granting the motion in 
part and denying it in part. The court granted Minnesota’s Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Privileges and Immunities and Due 
Process claims. The court also dismissed Attorney General Swanson as a 
party to the claim. The court, however, denied the motion on the federal 
preemption claims, finding North Dakota adequately alleged the Federal 
Power Act and Clean Air Act preemptions.57 Though the preemption claims 
persist at present, for the sake of brevity, this paper assumes that the court 
will decide the case based on the Commerce Clause and focuses its 
discussion accordingly.  
 
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
  
 The U.S. Constitution retains for the federal government the power 
to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian tribes.”58 The Constitution also provides that federal law 
is supreme when federal and state laws conflict. 59  Together, these two 
provisions act as an “express limitation upon state regulation of interstate 
commerce”60 where Congress has acted. These provisions, however, do not 
preclude a state from regulating some areas of interstate commerce.61 
 The dormant Commerce Clause is implicated when a state regulates 
some aspect of interstate commerce where Congress has not enacted 
legislation that would preempt the state action.62  When this sequence of 
events occurs, the courts must decide whether the state has “overstepped its 
role in regulating interstate commerce” 63  and thereby violated the U.S. 
Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has outlined two different lines of 
analysis for determining whether a state action violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause.64  
 First, “[w]hen a state statute directly regulates or discriminates 
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic 
interests over out-of-state interests, [the Court has] generally struck down the 
                                                 
 56  Id. 
 57  Memorandum Opinion and Order at 40, North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11-
cv-03232 (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 2012).  
 58  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 59  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 60  CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 
251 (2d ed. 2005). 
 61  See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986). 
 62  MASSEY, supra note 60, at 252. 
 63  Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138. 
 64  See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
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statute without further inquiry.”65 “Indeed, when the state statute amounts to 
simple economic protectionism, a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity’ has 
applied.”66 Under these circumstances, state statutes are subjected to strict 
scrutiny and are invalid “unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified 
by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism,”67 or the state “can 
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a 
legitimate local interest.”68 
 The second line of analysis, known as the Pike Test, stands for the 
principle that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are 
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”69 
Under either test, “the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute 
on both local and interstate activity.”70 “There is no ‘clear line’ separating 
those cases to which strict scrutiny applies and those to which the Pike [T]est 
applies.”71 
 
V.  ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS 
  
Both North Dakota and Minnesota have strong arguments to make in their 
favor. 72  This section of the paper analyzes arguments on each side and 
attempts to identify the most persuasive.73 
 
A. North Dakota’s Case 
 
 North Dakota has a strong argument that the NGEA violates the 
Commerce Clause because the NGEA (1) is facially discriminatory, (2) is 
discriminatory in practical effect, and (3) sets up a regulatory regime that has 
impermissible extraterritorial effects.74 
 
                                                 
 65  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986) (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978); Shafer v. 
Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640–44 
(1982)). 
 66  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992) (quoting City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624). 
 67  Id. at 454. 
 68  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994). 
 69  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 70 Nathan E. Enrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued 
Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, 
and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 266 (2008) (quoting Brown-
Forman, 476 U.S. at 579). 
 71  Id. 
 72  See infra Part V.A–B. 
 73  See infra Part V.A–B. 
 74  See infra Part V.A.1–3. 
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1. The NGEA is Facially Discriminatory.  
 
 North Dakota will most likely begin its argument by trying to 
establish that the NGEA is facially discriminatory so that the district court’s 
reasoning follows the first line of analysis detailed above.75 The benefit of 
the court finding the NGEA facially discriminatory is that it raises the 
standard of review to strict scrutiny; therefore, the court would be acting 
under a presumption of per se invalidity. 76  This is similar to City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey.77 In that case, a New Jersey law prohibited the 
importation of any solid or liquid waste that originated anywhere outside 
New Jersey until the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection determined that the solid or liquid waste could be 
imported safely and promulgated regulations of such actions. 78  The 
Commissioner promulgated regulations that permitted four categories of 
waste to enter New Jersey.79 Landfill operators and cities in other states that 
had agreements with the operators sued New Jersey and the Department of 
Environmental Protection, arguing that the statute and regulations were 
unconstitutional. 80  The trial court found the law an unconstitutional 
limitation on interstate commerce. 81  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the law “advanced vital health and environmental 
objectives with no economic discrimination against, and with little burden 
upon, interstate commerce.”82 The court also found that the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act did not preempt the state statute.83 The U.S. Supreme Court 
conducted its inquiry using the Pike Test, stating “[t]he crucial inquiry . . . 
must be directed to determining whether [New Jersey’s law] is basically a 
protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to 
legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only 
incidental.”84 
 In order to discern whether the New Jersey law was simply a 
protectionist measure or whether it was directed at legitimate local concerns, 
the Court looked first looked to the purpose of the statute itself.85 The Court 
eventually held that the ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved 
because: 
 
                                                 
 75  See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 76  See e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,544 (1949). 
 77  City of Philadelphia v. New. Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
 78  Id. at 618–19. 
 79  Id. at 619. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id at 620. 
 83  City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 620. 
 84  Id. at 624. 
 85  Id. at 625. 
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whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be 
accomplished by discriminating against articles of 
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is 
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them 
differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the New 
Jersey law] violates this principle of nondiscrimination.86  
 
Therefore, the Court held that the law was unconstitutional because there 
was no reason to treat the waste created outside the state differently from that 
created inside the state.87 
 North Dakota will likely begin its argument by attempting to 
analogize the NGEA with the New Jersey law in City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey.88 For example, North Dakota may argue that the NGEA “erect[ed] a 
barrier against the movement of interstate trade” 89 similar to New Jersey’s 
prohibition on the importation of waste by prohibiting the importation of 
electric power that would increase the state’s level of carbon emissions. 
Despite Minnesota’s good faith attempt to reduce the state’s carbon 
emissions, North Dakota will likely emphasize that this purpose may not be 
“accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from 
outside the State unless there is some reason . . . to treat them differently.”90 
Moreover, in City of Philadelphia, the Court held that the New Jersey law 
was not equivalent to a quarantine law, which had been held constitutional as 
a health-protective measure, 91  because the quarantine laws “did not 
discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented 
traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.”92 Like the New Jersey law, 
the NGEA does not prohibit the importation of certain articles in interstate 
commerce because of their noxious nature; rather, as the argument goes, the 
NGEA seeks to “saddle those outside the State” 93  with the burden of 
improving Minnesota’s level of carbon emissions. If the Court finds this 
argument convincing, it will likely strike down the NGEA as discriminatory 
and unconstitutional.94 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 86  Id. at 626–27. 
 87  Id. at 629. 
 88  See infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.  
 89   City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628. 
 90  Id. at 626–27. 
 91  Id. at 629; see Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935); 
Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888). 
 92  City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629. 
 93  Id.  
 94  See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
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2. The NGEA is Discriminatory in Practical Effect. 
  
 In addition to the facially discriminatory argument, North Dakota 
may argue that the NGEA is discriminatory in practical effect.95 The NGEA 
effectively prohibits a utility company from using new coal power to provide 
electricity to its customers by prohibiting the construction of any new coal 
plants within the state and importation of any coal power from outside the 
state.96 As existing coal plants inside and outside the state are retired, utilities 
providing electricity to Minnesotans will no longer be able to provide coal 
power because Minnesota has no coal resources of its own and the utilities 
will be unable to import coal for power generation purposes.97 Therefore, the 
practical effect of the statute is to unlawfully prohibit the ability of North 
Dakota coal companies and power plants from marketing coal power to 
consumers in Minnesota.98  
 
3. The NGEA Establishes an Impermissible Extraterritorial Regime.  
  
 Lastly, North Dakota may argue the extraterritorial effects of the 
NGEA require the court to strike the law down as unconstitutional.99 The 
Court in Healy v. Beer Institute articulated the extraterritorial facet of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.100 The Court in that case stated that it would 
strike down extraterritorial language that “directly controls commerce 
occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State”101 as a per se violation of 
the Constitution. Although the Court has not extensively articulated the 
principle, it appears that the principle applies only to state laws that further 
economic protectionism, and thus cannot be defended on the grounds of 
health and safety regulations, which are subject to a far more deferential 
review.102  
 One of the key elements of a state law that signals it will likely be 
struck down based on the extraterritorial principle is a law that has a 
predominant effect on conduct in other states.103 North Dakota will likely 
emphasize that the NGEA greatly affects the conduct of utility companies in 
North Dakota.104  Indeed, the NGEA effectively removes Minnesota as a 
market for North Dakota utility companies, the eventual conclusion of which 
is the preclusion of the construction of coal-fired power plants in North 
                                                 
 95  See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 96  MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3 (2010). 
 97  Zomer, supra note 30, at 91–92. 
 98  See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.  
 99  See infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
 100  Healey v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 101  Id.  
 102  See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982). 
 103  See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in 
American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 926 (2002). 
 104  See id.; supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.  
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Dakota because construction and operation of such plants becomes 
economically impractical without access to the Minnesota market.105 This 
situation will require that North Dakota utilities comply with the NGEA in 
order to be able to sell power to consumers in Minnesota, thereby 
“project[ing] [Minnesota’s] regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of [North 
Dakota].” 
106 
B. Minnesota’s Defense 
 
 Despite North Dakota’s strong arguments, the NGEA will survive 
this challenge because (1) the statute does not discriminate against articles of 
commerce that come from outside Minnesota, (2) even if the law is 
discriminatory, there are multiple reasons, aside from origin, to treat them 
differently, and (3) the NGEA passes the Pike Test.107 
 
1. The NGEA is Not Discriminatory. 
 
 As mentioned above, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey stands for 
the proposition that a statute is invalid if it “discriminat[es] against articles of 
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart 
from their origin, to treat them differently.”108 Although North Dakota will 
argue that the facts of the two cases are analogous, that is simply not the 
case. 109  The coal moratorium does not discriminate “against articles of 
commerce coming from outside the State” and therefore it is outside the 
bounds of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.110 The coal moratorium is not 
discriminatory because it both prohibits the use and generation of coal power 
that has been imported from other states and restricts the use and generation 
of coal power in Minnesota; thus, Minnesota is not simply prohibiting the 
importation of all electricity generated outside the state – a purely 
protectionist measure.111 Due to this distinction, coal power generated both 
inside and outside the state will cease to be an option for utilities in 
Minnesota because the coal moratorium prohibits the importation of coal 
power from outside the state and will eventually force the retirement and 
closure of existing coal plants in Minnesota.112  
                                                 
 105  See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.  
 106  Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37. 
 107  See infra Part V.B.1–3. 
 108  City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,626–27 (1978); see supra 
note 90 and accompanying text. 
 109  See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text; infra note 110 and 
accompanying text.  
 110  City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626–27; see supra notes 86–87 and 
accompanying text. . 
 111  See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.  
 112  See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
13
Braun: Next Generation Energy Act
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
492 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
 Moreover, the coal moratorium has no effect on sales outside of the 
state.113 This is important because the lack of such effect means that the 
NGEA does not require out-of-state commerce to be conducted according to 
in-state terms, thereby avoiding any argument of extraterritorial reach.114 In 
this sense, the NGEA does not discriminate against interstate commerce at 
all.115 
 The coal moratorium’s negligible burden on interstate commerce and 
its large local benefit preclude it from falling victim to a Commerce Clause 
challenge like some similar state programs, such as California’s Low Carbon 
Fuel Standard (LCFS).116 The LCFS requires that the carbon intensity of 
fuels used for transportation be reduced by ten percent from 2006 levels by 
2020.117   In order to accomplish this goal, the California Air Resources 
Board requires fuel providers to determine the “carbon intensity” of fuel 
throughout its entire lifecycle, including direct emissions from the burning of 
the fuel and the emissions resulting from transporting the fuel to 
California.118 Thus, the LCFS penalizes fuels produced in and transported 
from other states.119 This means that products such as biofuels produced in 
the Midwest have a higher carbon intensity number than biofuels produced in 
California, even if the product is exactly the same.120 For these reasons, 
opponents of the program argued that the LCFS is discriminatory on its 
face.121 
 The federal district court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 
Goldstene agreed and held that the LCFS discriminates against fuels 
produced outside of California (thus subjecting the regulation to strict 
scrutiny analysis) and impermissibly regulates extraterritorial conduct.122 The 
district court also found that the LCFS provides a local benefit in reducing 
global warming but that purpose could have been achieved through 
nondiscriminatory means.123  Moreover, the district court held that based on 
the purposes of the LCFS set forth in its guiding principles, the main 
function of the program was economic protectionism.124 For these reasons, 
                                                 
 113  See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
 114  See Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 115  See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.  
 116  Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (2006) with MINN. STAT. § 
216H.03, subd. 3(1) (2010). 
 117  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.2d 1071, 1079 
(E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 118  Id.at 1080. 
 119  Id.  
 120  See id at.1081. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id at 1105 
 123  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.2d 1071, 1093–94 
(E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 124  Id. at 1086–90. 
14
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/6
2013] NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT 493 
the district court issued an injunction that prohibited the enforcement of the 
LCFS program.125  
 Minnesota’s coal moratorium is distinguishable from California’s 
LCFS program because, as mentioned above, the coal moratorium treats coal 
power generated in and out of state in the same way and does not assign a 
higher price to coal or coal power produced outside of the state.126 In this 
way, the coal moratorium does not seek to regulate the coal power generation 
companies and their practices that occur outside of the state in the same way 
the LCFS does. 127  Because of these key differences, Minnesota’s coal 
moratorium is not discriminatory on its face and therefore will not meet the 
same fate as California’s LCFS program.128 
 
2. The NGEA Treats Coal Power Differently for Reasons Other than 
Origin 
  
 Even if a court does find that the NGEA discriminates against 
articles of commerce, the NGEA will still survive this challenge. 129 
Minnesota can still argue that there is a reason, apart from origin, to treat 
coal power differently. 130  For instance, using coal to generate power is 
carbon intensive and contributes more to atmospheric pollution than other 
sources of power, and the NGEA treats all future coal generation the same, 
regardless of its origin.131 Thus, rather than arbitrarily discriminating against 
coal power because of its origin, Minnesota treats coal power differently than 
other types of power because of its greater adverse effect on the 
environment.132 
 There is another reason, other than origin, for Minnesota to treat coal 
power differently:  that the NGEA’s regulatory scheme is set up to avoid the 
problem of carbon leakage, which would undermine Minnesota’s entire 
carbon emissions reduction plan.133 Carbon leakage occurs when a utility 
company must comply with a carbon restriction within a jurisdiction and 
instead of reducing its emissions, imports carbon intensive electricity from 
outside the jurisdiction.134 If the NGEA were devoid of the coal moratorium, 
the whole scheme would be ineffective in reducing Minnesota’s carbon 
emissions because utilities would simply import coal power from other 
                                                 
 125  Id.at 1105. 
 126  See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text.  
 127  See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text.  
 128  See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.  
 129  See infra notes 130–132  and accompanying text.  
 130  See infra notes 131–132 and accompanying text. 
 131  Zomer, supra note 30, at 93. 
 132  Id.  
 133  See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
 134  See IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http:// www.ipcc.ch/publications 
_and_data /ar4/wg3/en/ch11s11-7-2.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012). 
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states.135 Thus, the NGEA does not discriminate against coal power from 
other jurisdictions as an economic protectionist measure; rather, the NGEA 
discriminates against all coal power for the sake of establishing a coherent 
regulatory scheme that cannot be bypassed via importation. 136  For these 
reasons, even if the district court finds the NGEA is facially discriminatory, 
it will uphold the law because it permissibly discriminates for reasons other 
than origin.137 
 
3. The NGEA Passes the Pike Test.  
  
 Because the district court will likely find that the coal moratorium is 
not discriminatory, the court may look to the Pike standard in order to weigh 
whether the coal moratorium, despite regulating “evenhandedly with only 
‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce,”138 still runs afoul of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The district court will not strike down the 
nondiscriminatory law “unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”139 The NGEA 
will survive judicial scrutiny under the Pike Test because the benefits from 
reducing its carbon emissions outweigh the burden the NGEA places on 
interstate commerce.140 Minnesota has a convincing argument that reducing 
its carbon emissions has great value after the Supreme Court held as much in 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.141 In that case, the Court 
recognized that “[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and 
well recognized.” 142  Therefore, steps taken to diminish a state’s carbon 
emissions — and by extension global climate change — have benefits.143 
Thus, the NGEA satisfies the Pike Test because the steps taken by the state 
legislature to reduce the state’s carbon emissions have benefits that outweigh 
the incidental burden placed on interstate commerce by the coal 
moratorium.144 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the court has not yet dispensed with North Dakota’s 
preemption arguments, the Commerce Clause issue will most likely control 
                                                 
 135  See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.  
 136  See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
 137  See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 138  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–37 (1979). 
 139  Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338–39 (2008) (alteration in 
original) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 140  See infra note 141 and accompanying text.  
 141  Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). 
 142  Id. at 521. 
 143  Id. at 524–26. 
 144  See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.  
16
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/6
2013] NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT 495 
the decision reached in this case.145 Despite North Dakota’s protest, the coal 
moratorium will survive unscathed because the law does not discriminate on 
its face and even if it does, it discriminates for reasons other than origin, such 
as the effectiveness of the overall carbon emissions reduction scheme and the 
fact that using coal to generate power is carbon intensive and contributes 
more to atmospheric pollution than other sources of power.146 In addition, the 
NGEA satisfies the Pike standard because it regulates “evenhandedly with 
only ‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce.”147 For these reasons, the 
district court will reject North Dakota’s claim and uphold the 
constitutionality of the NGEA.148 
 
                                                 
 145  See supra note 57.  
 146  See supra Part V.B. 
 147  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–37 (1979). See supra Part V.B.3. 
 148  See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text.  
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